The Day (Ukraine)
Boris Sokolov
The Armenian troops are exhausted in an unequal struggle and seem to be unable to present the enemy with some “miracle on the Arax”. It appears that the Azerbaijani army has fulfilled the tasks of the first stage of the offensive by cutting the main road that supplies Armenian troops in Nagorno-Karabakh in the North and occupying the border areas with Iran in the South. The strategic bridge on the last remaining Armenian-held Lachin road leading to Karabakh was badly damaged, most likely by an Azerbaijani missile. Judging by the analysis of video materials provided by the parties, made by military experts, Armenia suffered more significant losses than Azerbaijan in armored vehicles, artillery and air defense systems
Most likely, the Azerbaijani losses in people are less than the Armenian ones. This is indicated, in particular, by the fact that already in the first days of the fighting, the authorities of Armenia and Nagorno-Karabakh called on the population to urgently donate blood, which is not enough for the wounded. On the contrary, the Azerbaijani authorities, even after a week of fighting, convince the population that there is no need to donate blood yet, since there are still enough available supplies of donor blood for the needs of the wounded. Azerbaijan has so far announced only partial mobilization. The Armenian authorities not only carried out a General mobilization, but also called for the return to the army of those who were demobilized from it during the last year and are not subject to immediate mobilization by law. And all this despite the fact that in terms of weapons and military equipment, Azerbaijan already has a quantitative and qualitative superiority over Armenia, as well as in the number of personnel.
In addition, the first prisoners of war appeared, and these are soldiers of the Armenian army. According to a number of signs, the Armenian troops are retreating and have not yet managed to conduct a single successful counterattack. The Armenian command is concentrating more and more forces in Nagorno-Karabakh, thereby driving them into a trap. If Yerevan still has any forces left, it is necessary to try to launch a powerful counter-attack and break up the Northern group of Azerbaijani troops, freeing the road to Karabakh. If there are no forces for such a strike, we can safely begin the evacuation of the Armenian troops and population from Karabakh. Otherwise, all of them will soon find themselves in Azerbaijani captivity. Without ammunition, you can’t resist. The case may be completed in the next 10-15 days. The Azerbaijani army has already announced its readiness to provide humanitarian corridors for the Armenian civilian population and those soldiers who are ready to stop resistance to leave Karabakh.
The weakness of the Armenian army at the moment is indicated by rocket attacks on Azerbaijani cities in a futile attempt to provoke retaliatory attacks on cities on the territory of Armenia proper, which would allow Moscow to ask to activate the CSTO. Also, Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan stated that Armenia is ready to make concessions in the Karabakh conflict, without specifying, however, what exactly the concessions may consist of, and demanding similar, but unnamed concessions from the Azerbaijani side. However, in the current situation, Ilham Aliyev is unlikely to agree to a ceasefire on conditions other than the complete withdrawal of Armenian troops from Nagorno-Karabakh.
As for Russia’s position, Dmitry Peskov, in response to the desperate appeal of two Armenian businessmen Ruben Vardanyan and Samvel Karapetyan to Vladimir Putin with a request to help Armenia as soon as possible, said that it is difficult to imagine “more active steps on the part of Russia than now.” So far, these steps are limited to calls for a cease-fire, which in themselves cannot stop the war.
The approaching with each passing day the threat of destruction of Armenian forces us to reconsider many of the stereotypes. The overwhelming majority of military experts, and not only in Russia, are convinced that the Armenian army is completely superior to the Azerbaijani army in terms of combat training and motivation of its personnel. This view is certainly consistent with the realities of the war of 1992-1994. But more than a quarter of a century has passed since then. Those Armenian officers who fought as lieutenants in Karabakh in the early 90’s either retired from the army long ago, or hold much higher positions at the level of colonels and generals. The ranks and sergeants who defeated the Azerbaijanis in their time are no longer in the Armenian army.
The situation is exactly the same in the Azerbaijani army. In the early 90’s, it lost due to the lack of a national military tradition in Azerbaijan. In tsarist Russia, Azerbaijanis were exempt from military service, and only a few volunteers served in the army. But even in Soviet times, Azerbaijani conscripts served mainly in non-combat positions, and there were very few regular officers and sergeants among Azerbaijanis. However, the situation has changed radically since then. The Azerbaijani authorities, using petrodollars, not only bought weapons and military equipment where they could, but also trained the officer corps in foreign schools and academies, mainly in Turkey, and were trained inside the country under the guidance of Turkish and Israeli instructors. As a result, the current Azerbaijani army is in many ways a clone of the Turkish army, although it is inferior to it in terms of weapons and combat training.
The Turkish army, with the same reservations, is a clone of the American one. With this in mind, the Azerbaijani army is more or less adapted for modern non-contact combat with the abundant use of drones. The Armenian army, which has much more modest opportunities to acquire modern weapons and military equipment, still remains a clone of the Soviet army, not even the Russian one, with its commitment to contact combat with the creation of shock groups and concentration on the main directions of artillery and tanks. But this doctrine is not suitable for non-contact combat. In conditions of mass use of UAVs, on the contrary, a dispersed location of manpower and equipment is required.
Undoubtedly, after the end of the current war, the Armenian army will have to be radically reformed. Nikol Pashinyan had neither the time nor the opportunity for such a reform. It required not only an expensive purchase of modern means of combat, including electronic warfare, but also a gradual change of command. Pashinyan needed the support of the army and could not make radical changes in the army command. The reform of the army is not only very expensive, but also slow. it requires a change of generations of the officer corps, i.e. 15-20 years.